The obligation to serve the public interest is integral to the “trusteeship” model of broadcasting, the philosophical foundation upon which broadcasters are expected to operate. The trusteeship paradigm is used to justify government regulation of broadcasting. It maintains that the electromagnetic spectrum is a limited resource belonging to the public, and only those most capable of serving the public interest are to be entrusted with a broadcast license. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the U.S. government body responsible for determining whether applicants for broadcast licenses meet the requirements to obtain them, and the FCC also further regulates those to whom licenses have been granted.

Interpretation of the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” clause has been a continuing source of controversy. Initially, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) implemented a set of tests, criteria that would loosely define whether the broadcasting entity was fulfilling its obligation to the listening public. Specifications included program diversity, quality reception, and “character” evaluation of licensees. These initial demands set a precedent for future explications of the public interest.

The pretelevision “Blue Book,” as the set of criteria was popularly known, was developed by the FCC in 1946 to evaluate the discrepancy between the programming “promise” and “performance” of radio broadcasters. Since license renewal was dependent on serving the public interest, program content became a significant consideration in this procedure. The “Blue Book” required licensees to promote the discussion of public issues, serve minority interests, and eliminate superfluous advertising. Unpopular with commercial broadcasters, the “Blue Book” was rendered obsolete after five years because of the economic threat it posed.

In its “1960 Program Policy Statement,” the FCC echoed similar sentiments pertaining to television broadcasters. In response to assorted broadcasting scandals, the FCC issued this statement to “remind” broadcasters of how to serve the public interest. Although previous tenets of the “Blue Book” were rejected, this revised policy included the “license ascertainment” stipulation, requiring broadcasters to determine local programming needs through distribution and analysis of surveys. However, adherence to such programming policies has never been strictly enforced.

The deregulatory fervor of the 1980s seriously challenged the trusteeship model of broadcasting. Obviously, this same move toward deregulation subsequently challenged the means by which satisfaction of the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” should be determined. The rise of cable television undermined the “scarcity of the spectrum” argument because of the newer system’s potential for unlimited channel capacity. The trusteeship model was replaced with the “marketplace” model (which had always undergirded commercial broadcasting in the United States). It was now argued that the contemporary, commercially supported telecommunications environment could provide a multiplicity of voices, eradicating the previous justification for government regulation. Under this model, the public interest would be defined by “market forces.” A broadcaster’s commercial success would be indicative of the public’s satisfaction with that broadcaster.

Advocates of the marketplace argument reject the trusteeship model of broadcasting. It is no surprise that the Cable Act does not contain a “public interest, convenience, and necessity” stipulation. However, because cable also falls under the regulatory scrutiny of the FCC, serving the public interest is encouraged through the PEG (public, educational, and government) access requirement related to the granting of cable franchises.

Among the deregulatory policies implemented during the 1980s were the relaxation of ownership and licensing rules, eradication of assorted public-service requirements, and the elimination of regulations limiting the amount of commercial advertising in children’s programming. Perhaps most detrimental to the legal justification for the trusteeship model of broadcasting, however, was the abolition of the Fairness Doctrine. This action altered future interpretations of the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” clause.

In 1949 the FCC established the Fairness Doctrine as a policy that guaranteed (among other things) the presentation of both sides of a controversial issue. This concept is rooted in the early broadcast regulation of the Federal Radio Commission. In 1959 Congress declared the doctrine part of the Communications Act in order to safeguard the public interest and First Amendment freedoms. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in the case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969). Although the Fairness Doctrine was enacted to promote pluralism, it eventually produced an opposite effect. Concerned that advertising time would be squandered by those who invoked the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters challenged its constitutionality, claiming that it promoted censorship instead of diversity. Declared in violation of the First Amendment, the Fairness Doctrine was repealed, and in 1987 President Ronald Reagan vetoed attempts to provide constitutional protection for the doctrine.

The 1996 Telecommunication Act, the most sweeing revision of U.S. policies in history, confirmed the dominance of the “marketplace” model. Taking note of a wider range of communication technologies no longer reliant on the limited electromagnetic spectrum, the act was presumably designed to encourage “competition” among media suppliers, thereby enhancing and increasing options available to the “public.” In practice, the act enabled a round of massive mergers, placing ownership of distribution devices as well as content production under control of fewer and fewer entities. By 2002 many of these large companies foundered, and the “marketplace” was in a precarious state.

The obligation to serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” is demonstrated through myriad broadcast policies. Licensing requirements, the equal-time and candidate access rules, the Fairness Doctrine, and the Public Broadcasting and Cable Acts are just some examples of U.S. regulations that were implemented to safeguard the public from the possible selfish motives of broadcasters. History has proven, however, that interpretation of the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” is subject to prevailing political forces. The development of new technologies continues to test the trusteeship model of broadcasting and what defines the public interest. Yet despite its ambiguity and the difficulties encountered in its application, this phrase remains the stated regulatory cornerstone of telecommunications policy in the United States.