Samuel L. Warner parlayed his interest in sound­ film technology into a Warner Brothers radio station, KFWB, in 1925, proposing that other studios recognize the potential in this new medium as well. Loew's New York station, WHN, provided one of the few consistent venues for black jazz musicians in the 1920s and early 1930s. Despite some exhibitors' objections, both Paramount and MGM announced their intention to form radio networks in the late 1920s. Paramount eventually became half-owner of CBS, until the studio was forced to sell back its stock in 1932; MGM went on to participate in radio program origination with The Maxwell House Showboat in the 1930s; and in a reversal of this pattern RCA, parent of NBC, acquired its own film studio, RKO, in 1929.

     With the entry of advertising agencies into radio pro­duction in the early 1930s, the somewhat stuffy "potted­ palm" aesthetic of NBC gave way to Hollywood-based showmanship, and film stars and film properties made up an increasing proportion of radio's daily schedules. Hollywood became a major broadcast production center in the mid- l 930s, with such programs as Hollywood Hotel, the Lux Radio Theater (hosted by Cecil B. De­ Mille), and most major v_ariety shows featuring Holly­ wood talent originating from the West Coast studios of NBC, CBS, and major agencies.

     In turn, as radio developed its own roster of stars, the studios capitalized on a long series of radio pictures, from Amos and Andy's Check and Double Check in 1932 and the Big Broadcast films to the Bob Hope and Bing Crosby "road" movies of the 1940s. The studios also capitalized on the promotional capacity of radio in the form of spot advertising, using audio-only trailers as an important part of film promotion.

     This lucrative and mutually beneficial relationship, combined with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation kept Hollywood from developing its potential for competition with network broadcasting by restricting the use of recorded material for syndication. Not until the advent of television did film itself present a strong alternative to provision of live programming via networks. Paramount, Warner Brothers, Loew's-MGM, and 20th Century-FOX had all opened stations or applied for television station licenses in the late 1940s, but indications from the FCC that movie studios would not be looked upon favorably in post­ freeze allocations led to experimentation with other methods of capitalizing on the television medium.

     Hollywood studios plunged into television on three fronts: first, in the development of pay television systems in the late 1940s, designed to provide feature films on a box-office basis; second, in experiments with theater television, a method for projecting television onto movie theater screens; and third, in direct production for television, both network and syndicated. Paramount experimented with its Telemeter pay-per-view system, along with Zenith's Phonevision and the Skiatron Corporation's over the air technology; FCC discouragement of this potentially powerful competition to network broadcasting prevented pay television from becoming a reality and allowed the cable industry to find a foothold. Both FOX and Paramount attempted to develop theater television, but the expansion of individual TV set sales, combined with the FCC's refusal to allocate part of the mostly unused UHF band for transmission, brought this short­-lived technology to a halt. By the early 1950s the studios had turned to television production, led by Hollywood independents but culminating in the Dis­ ney/ABC alliance that produced Disneyland in 1954. Warner Brothers and MCA/Universal followed, as network expansion and consolidation allowed a shift from live programming to filmed series. By 1960, 40 percent of network programming was produced by the major Hollywood studios and the proportion continued to grow.

     The FCC's institution of the Financial Interest and Syndication (Fin-Syn) Rules in the mid- l970s finally allowed the production companies to break free of network dominance of the lucrative syndication market. Combined with the growth of cable, where the federal Must-Carry Rule helped provide new audiences for independent stations, the market for Hollywood­ produced series, specials, miniseries, and movie packages skyrocketed in the 1980s. Pay-cable companies such as HBO and Showtime provided new funds for production capital.

     By the late 1980s, history had come full circle, as Rupert Murdoch's vertically integrated Twentieth Century-FOX corporation formed the first successful fourth network in U.S. broadcasting history. The new FOX network capitalized on a ready supply of in­-house programming, newly powerful independent stations, niche marketing to youth, and favorable FCC regulation in order to prove that the Hollywood film industry and network television broadcasting had only remained separate for 40 years as a result of heavy legislative intervention.

     Paramount and Warner Brothers were not slow to take heed, starting up two new networks, the United Paramount Network (UPN, which drew on the success of the syndicated Star Trek series) and the WB (geared primarily to adolescent audiences), in January 1995. That same year, a wave of mergers hit the industry as Westinghouse Corporation bought the CBS network and Time Warner merged with Turner Broadcasting. Disney's purchase of ABC in 1996 confirmed the studio-network alliance. This alliance also relied on the rewriting of ownership rules in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which loosened caps on the number of stations an individual or company could own.

     By the late 1990s, as cable, telephone, computer and broadcasting companies struggled for favorable alliances with Hollywood-based creative organizations, the relationship of Hollywood and television continued its cruise at warp speed into the integrated and interactive sphere of cyberspace. Upstart Internet provider America OnLine (AOL) purchased entertainment behemoth Time Warner to become AOL Time Warner, a merger which ultimately failed. The potential for high-speed cable access at least partially drove the deal; AOL controlled 54 percent of the Internet access market, while Time Warner Cable reached over 20 percent of the U.S. public with valuable broadband connections. Viacom Corporation, the cable, film, and television production empire and parent of Paramount, purchased CBS in 1999, finally bringing CBS and Paramount together in the networking business again. However, since ownership of more than one television network was illegal under current ownership restrictions, Viacom (which already owned UPN) at once set about lobbying for a further relaxation of the rules, and in 2001 it received permission from the Federal Communications Commission to own both entities. Net­ works vied for the most prominent web presence, from Warner Brothers' leading position on AOL to Disney's purchase of the web portal SNAP in 1998, and ABC/Disney's creation of the Go Network, a new portal launched in 1999. However, both Warner and Dis­ ney had retreated from the portal business by 2001, even as the new synergy produced glossy websites featuring current film and television productions.

     Synergy could have unanticipated results. For example, Twentieth Century-FOX attracted notoriety early in 2000 when it sought to curb websites featuring its popular series Buffy the Vampire Slayer. The Simpsons, and The X Files, as fans began to circulate their own video clips, audio segments, and transcripts of the show. These and many other ownership, copyright, and competitive issues promised to trouble the now fully integrated film and television industries of the United States in the 21st century, even as those industries continue to expand across the globe.