Society for Motion Picture and Television Engineers
Society for Motion Picture and Television Engineers
While the history of motion pictures and television is typically linked to the rise of commercial mass entertainment, the extent of industry growth cannot be adequately explained without acknowledging the extensive benefits that came from technical standardization. Incorporated in July 1916, the Society for Motion Picture Engineers (SMPE) sought to act as a professional forum for its members and to publish technical findings "deemed worthy of permanent record." The impact of society, however, extended far beyond the research reports published in SMPE's Journal and Transactions. With film pioneer Francis Jenkins installed as its charter president, the society took as its first task the development of a 35-millimeter format–the standard on which the motion picture and telefilm industries were built. Subsequent SMPE interventions codified two-color cinematography (November 1918). three-color Technicolor (August 1935), and optical sound-recording technologies (October 1930. September 1938). Although the organization began as a professional association for technical specialists, its public actions worked as an antidote to the high-risk economic and methodological instabilities that accompanied the introduction of each new film/television technology.
Bio
Research interests in television predated by decades the formal addition of "Television" to the society's name in 1950 (SMPTE). Groundbreaking work was published on alternative delivery systems ("Radio Photographs. Radio Movies and Radio Vision" by C.F. Jenkins. May 1923). on vacuum-tube imaging devices ("konoscopes and Kinescopes" by V.K. Zworykin, May 1937), and on the Radio Corporation of America's (RCA's) field test of a comprehensive broadcasting system in New York (R .R. Beal, August 1937).
While this prewar flurry of engineering interest in television may suggest that society had a proactive and determining influence on the development of television technology. subsequent events demonstrate just how provisional SMPE's recommendations were. For example, although the Journal published standards for the Columbia Broadcasting System's (CBS's) new high-resolution color-television system in April 1942, other parties used coercion and economic clout to convince the U.S. government to opt for an inferior system in 1947. Disregarding the 1942 standards, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) favored the less developed alternative of RCA/National Broadcasting Company (NBC). thereby forcing engineers to impose color information onto the limited black-and white bandwidth of NTSC-a system that had itself been hastily (and some would say prematurely) adopted in 1941. Similarly, despite the open-ended, forward-thinking proposals put forth by Jenkins for theatrical television, pay-per-view TV. and set licensing subsidies in 1923, the harsh regulatory realities of the FCC licensing freeze from 1948 to 1952 effectively deferred development of alternative delivery technologies for decades . A three-network oligopoly would dominate for almost 30 years as a result of the freeze. enabled by economic and regulatory collusion rather than engineering wisdom.
Although such actions demonstrate the limited influence of the society's recommendations on technology standards (SMPTE is not a government regulatory body like the FCC but an association of professionals representing a wide range of proprietary corporations). subsequent breakthroughs mark key points in the history of television technology . Standards for the eventual victor in the color-television race (NTSC) were finally published in April 1953 . Engineers from Ampex disseminated information on the first commercially successful video tape recorder (VTR) in April 1957-an event that led to the precipitous death of the kinescope. initiated intense competition among VTR developers in the years that followed, and altered forever the way viewers see "liveness" (live-on-tape).
The international battle over high-definition television (HDTV) demonstrates the strategic role a standard-setting organization can take in the international arena. NHK in Japan had produced and begun marketing an HDTV system in the early 1980s, long before U.S. corporations entered the fray with working prototypes. Although the U.S. industry thus lagged behind foreign competitors in the race for viable "digital" video systems, SMPTE began to disseminate engineering standards for a spate of new digital television recording formats developed in Europe and Japan starting in December 1986 . U.S. broadcasters initially resisted HDTV development because of the tremendous costs involved in changing over from current transmission systems. Eventually, however, the government intervened to dictate that the United States would ostensibly produce a single "consensus" digital HDTV system. The resulting "grand alliance" minimized the risk of losing an expensive research-and-development race, but foreign trade journalists complained that U.S. government muscle would lead unfairly to the privileges of U.S . HDTV standards in international markets despite the late entry of the United States into the high-definition arena. As this example shows, engineering standards can be political footballs used for economic leverage and technological nationalism.
What looked initially like an HDTV alliance, however, fell apart when competing interests (the computer, motion picture, and broadcast industries) took aim at the governmental regulators behind the initiative . Given the free-market ideology in play during the Clinton administration, the FCC proved unwilling to dictate a single technical standard for HDTV. The commission announced that it would allow "the market to decide" and then sanctioned 14 different technical standards (from 480p to I 080i) for what was now called "digital television" rather than HDTV. Four years of technical volatility and confusion followed despite FCC dictates that broadcasters had until 2003 to deliver new high-definition digital television. With ambivalent broadcasters mired in conflict with consumer electronics manufacturers and both at odds with the Hollywood establishment that has thrown its weight behind a competing system (24p). television's transition to digital has been stunted.
The volatility in this kind of pseudo-market environment demonstrates why such standards and engineering organizations as SMPTE have proved central participants in change. With regulators now essentially silent and with massive conglomeration defining the industry. SMPTE helps provide much-needed forms of rationality (scientific method) and a set of ground rules (benchmarks for those 14 competing digital formats) that keeps change intelligible and manageable.
SMPTE's future influence will depend on how well it comes to grips with several substantive changes. It must respond to the technological "convergence" blurring boundaries between film and electronic media, it must continue to demonstrate the value of common technical ground within the proprietary world of multinational corporations, and it must engage a membership that increasingly lies outside the confines of traditional film and television engineering. As studios are reduced to computerized desktops and practitioners with technical backgrounds cross over into creative capacities (and vice versa), technological discourses will become no less important or problematic. Given the capital-intensive and market-driven nature of electronic media, issues of standardization and technological "order" will be more crucial to the future of television than ever.